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Abstract: Digital media are driving profound changes in contemporary politics, including, this 
article argues, to the production, reception and dissemination of political ideas and ideologies. 
Platforms increase the number and political range of ‘ideological entrepreneurs’ using distinct 
rhetorics through which ideas are articulated and experienced. Developing and justifying these 
claims I draw on the political theory of ideologies, digital media studies and rhetorical political 
analysis. I show how a populist ‘style’ and appeal to rhetorical ethos, linked to mediatisation, 
are intensified by digital media, affecting ideological form and content. Explaining in particular 
how YouTube constitutes political-ideological communication I examine in detail the British-
based political YouTuber Paul Joseph Watson. I show that his political ideology is a blend of 
conservatism and libertarianism, with a populist style and rhetorical ethos of ‘charismatic’ 
authority. Centred on the revelation of political truths, presented as of therapeutic benefit for 
individuals, it is characteristic of the medium. 
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YouTube and Political Ideologies: Technology, Populism & Rhetorical Form 
 
Introduction 
 
Understanding and assessing the effects on political processes of digital, participatory and 
shareable media is a key challenge for Political Studies. An early wave of optimistic work on 
the democratic potential of what were once ‘new’ media has been replaced by investigations 
into how the internet is challenging the conduct of democratic politics at a number of levels. 
These include theoretical and analytical reflections on how the internet changes ‘the character 
of political power and legitimacy’ (Runciman, 2017, 5), connects to our democratic aspirations 
(Coleman, 2017) and interacts with systems of news, information and government (Chadwick, 
2017). There are studies of the impact of digital media on specific political processes including 
elections (Margetts, 2017), parties (Dommett, 2018; Gerbaudo, 2018b) and campaigning 
(Dommett & Temple, 2018). Valuable interdisciplinary research into how the visual and affect-
driven aspects of digital political culture alter people’s experiences of politics (e.g. Dean, 2019) 
connects with an expanding literature within media and digital studies on the politics of 
platform designs and uses (Massanari, 2015) and of the ‘connective’ and ‘affective’ 
communities to which they give rise (Papacharissi, 2015). This article draws on and contributes 
to such assessments of the effects of digital media by adding to them research informed by the 
political theory of political ideologies (e.g. Freeden, 2005; 2006; Finlayson, 2012; Stears et al., 
2012) and by rhetorical theory and analysis. Digital media stimulate growth in ‘ideological 
entrepreneurship’ (individuals earning a living from disseminating political ideas), change the 
qualities and characteristics of political rhetoric and affect how people identify with political 
positions and ideologies. Understanding this is a pressing concern. 
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To develop and explain these claims I firstly situate the argument in relation to contemporary 
research into political ideologies, particularly the ‘turn’ to studying populist ‘style’ and the 
mediatisation of politics. Style, I suggest, is part of what rhetoric scholars call ‘ethos’, the 
explanation and justification of claims by grounding them in the ‘ethical’ character of speakers 
and propositions and their relationship to that of audiences. Research shows that audio-visual 
media emphasise the personality and character of political actors, demanding of them an 
identifiable ‘style’ and, I argue, make political rhetoric and argumentation centre ever more on 
appeals to ethos. In the second section I consider how structural features of social media (the 
organisation of the production and consumption of communication) intensify this focus on 
ethos. Taking YouTube as an example I show that it requires users to emphasise their persona 
or ethos, and creates particular sorts of relationship with audiences/consumers. In a third 
section I drill deeper still, analysing an exemplary instance of YouTube political-discursive 
production: that of the prominent British right-wing online activist Paul Joseph Watson. 
Locating Watson’s thinking within an ideological context (of Libertarianism, Conservatism 
and Populism) I explain the rhetorical style through which he communicates his ‘political 
theory’: the construction of an ‘antagonism’ against a ‘new class’ and an emphasis on ‘secrets’ 
and revelations. This, I show, is united and ‘grounded’ in the performance of an ethos of one 
brave and bold enough to reveal ‘the truth’. The appeal of Watson’s rhetoric lies in the promise 
that identifying with this ethos is of therapeutic value to the individuals who subscribe to this 
world view (and to his YouTube channel). 
 
In a subsequent discussion section I connect these three stages of the analysis. I argue that 
Watson is an exemplar of a political style in which the rhetoric of ethos is brought to the fore 
and political identification with it presented as a kind of personal therapy. Platforms such as 
YouTube induce this kind of political performance in which people appear as authoritative, 
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interpreters of what is ‘really’ going on, inviting viewers to experience this truth for 
themselves. This ‘charismatic’ style (Weber, 1946), in development before the explosion of 
digital media, is intensified but also individualised by social media technologies. 
 
The article thus brings together and integrates research from three (sub)fields: the political 
theory of political ideologies; rhetorical political analysis; sociologies of digital media. In so 
doing it contributes to the wider theory and analysis of politics in the era of digital 
communication through the provision of an original case-study of a novel political-rhetorical 
form (the reach and significance of which is underappreciated), by showing that platforms such 
as YouTube affect the form taken by political communication, and with the argument that this 
is reshaping ideological ‘style’, form and content in ways that Political Studies needs to attend 
to. 
 
Populism and Mediatisation: Form, Style and Rhetoric 
 
Social and digital media are novel, but not wholly so. To understand the effects of these 
technologies on communication practices we need to put them into a larger context (Williams, 
1973) including that of pre-existing practices, and established relationships between media and 
politics. Here, I do that through a consideration of contemporary theories of the link between 
a populist form or style of ideology and media communication.  
 
A cleavage runs between those who see populism as primarily a form and those for whom it is 
primarily a content. For the former – best represented by the discourse theory associated with 
Laclau - populism is a structural moment of ‘the political’, positing a ‘people’ in opposition to 
that which hinders them in their political development (Laclau, 2005); varied political demands 
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and struggles can be united under the name of the people and organised in line with this populist 
logic. For the latter, exemplified by Mudde, it is a particular if ‘thin’ ideology, organised around 
the concept of ‘the people’ and characterised by a moral register which opposes the inherent 
‘goodness’ of popular sovereignty to the essential wickedness of elites (e.g. Mudde, 2004; 
Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). A third, complementary, approach sees Populism as a ‘style’ – 
defined as ‘the repertoires of performance that are used to create political relations’ (Moffitt 
and Tormey, 2014: 387). This is characterised by three key features: the appeal to ‘the people’ 
versus ‘the elite’; bad manners; invocations of crisis, breakdown or threat (Tormey and Moffit, 
2014). The value of this analysis is, firstly, its emphasis on how an ideology is manifested and 
communicated. Communicative style is like a hinge, joining general ideological form with 
specific ideological contents. Secondly, it helps us see how the media ‘stage’ makes possible 
and constitutes such stylised performances, and that if we want to understand populism, 
ideologies and political style we need also to understand ‘mediatisation’ (Couldry, 2013). 
 
The extensive and intensive nature of media communication is such that it is not merely an 
external influence on an otherwise distinct political sphere; media run through and orient all 
sorts of political relations and actions. Politics has been ‘mediatised’ and the representation of 
political representation, as it were, forces the latter to adapt to the former. For example, politics 
on television is experienced and evaluated not only as politics but also as television; political 
actors able to adapt to the presentational codes that make for ‘good’ television flourish in place 
of those who cannot (see Debray, 2007). Of particular significance is television’s domestic 
nature. Consumed in the home, focused on the image of a ‘talking head’ addressing the 
audience, it demands the communication of personality and intimacy (Ellis, 1982; Williams, 
1973). 
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The effects of this on political communication in the second half of the twentieth-century are 
well-documented. Empirical analysis of language-use in Party Election Broadcasts since the 
nineteen-sixties shows a marked increase in ‘prefabricated sequences of words’ (standard 
phrases typical of conversation), four times as many first-person pronouns and three times as 
many second-person pronouns, indicative of informalization (Pearce, 2005). Atkins’s and 
Finlayson’s (2012) study of party leaders’ conference speeches also found political arguments 
adapted for television - written so as to win news coverage and to prove the ‘ordinary’ character 
of leaders through anecdotes, personal testimony and forms of argument made popular by 
television talk-shows. Clarke et. al. show how popular judgements of what makes a ‘good 
politician’ have come to centre on ideas of ‘normality’, how ‘like us’ or ‘in-touch’ politicians 
are’ (2018: Chapter 8). 
 
Political language has been adapted to the forms and norms of television discourse and political 
figures have become celebrities (Street, 2004). Like other media ‘stars’ they are known, 
recognised, and identified with, as embodiments of social types (see Dyer, 1986) and as 
performers of ‘stylised forms of individuality, which offer a temporary focus for identification 
and organization by fluid collectives (or ‘audiences’)’ (Corner and Pels, 2003: 8). Relentless 
media coverage mixes public roles with private behaviours leading to the ‘informalisation’ of 
charisma and everyday details of politicians’ appearance come to seem as informative or 
significant as policy claims (Pels, 2003: 45). In the language of rhetorical analysis (Finlayson 
and Martin 2008) the mediatised reorientation of political communication around personality 
leads to the foregrounding of ‘ethos’. Here, ‘style’ acquires political-ideological significance. 
Ethos is the rhetorical proof which rests on ‘character’: on the generic characteristics or 
attributes of a person (the type or category to which they belong or may be made to seem to 
belong); on what might be thought to make them special or distinct; on their relationship to the 
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character of audiences and communities in general (such as ‘the people’).  ‘Proof’ requires 
successful performance of a style, a ‘character’, linking a political analysis with a cultural, 
moral, category and with which people are invited to identify. Thatcher’s enactment of 
authoritarian conservatism and Blair’s exemplification of ‘modernised’ managerial ‘social-
ism’ (both performed in ‘heroic’ opposition to their party culture) were presented as solutions 
to problems of the present which they also characterized and diagnosed (Finlayson, 2012: 9-
10). They could thus also be invitations to identify one’s place in that present (and in a putative 
future) and to become a certain kind of political subject: a Thatcherite, a Blairite. 
 
Audio-visual media, then, demand a ‘style’ of political communication which emphasises 
individuals’ ‘personality’. That induces rhetorics centred on ethos and with a populist 
dimension insofar as the generic character of leaders, the ‘social type’ they appear to be and 
which has always been important, becomes central to argument, linked with claims about the 
ethical-moral character of policies and peoples and made a focus of supporters’ identification.  
Moffitt is therefore right to say that ‘many of the attributes of media logic are roughly 
analogous with (or at least complementary to) the features of populism as a political style’ 
(2016:76). That is why many contemporary politicians (popular as well as populist) have a 
background as media owners, journalists or television performers (see Moffitt, 2016:  88-94). 
However, the television age is over. The pressing question for us now is how digital, 
participatory and shareable forms of media affect this ‘populist’ rhetorical style. 
 
Politics and Digital Communication: The Case of YouTube  
 
Participatory and shareable digital media have shattered politicians’ monopoly on the lead roles 
in performances of social and political dramas. Ever more people may audition for and get the 
part. Social media platforms (such as Twitter, Reddit, Facebook) have fundamentally changed 
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the production and consumption of political communication, giving rise to new genres built 
out of (and in reaction to) pre-digital forms of communication. The term ‘platforms’ makes it 
feel as if they merely host our communicative interactions (Gillespie, 2010) but in reality they 
are ‘actively regulating their users content and behaviour through increasingly complex 
sociotechnical mechanisms of control’ (Burgess and Green, 2018: 10). Highly structured fields 
of activity, they are made out of software protocols and codes influenced by the culture and 
outlook of the designers, the rules and regulations of the platform (shaped by owners’ economic 
and ideational outlook) and the social behaviours enforced by user communities (Massanari, 
2015; Gillespie, 2018). 
 
A challenge for media analysts is to understand the iterative interaction of platform designers’ 
designs with users’ uses; a challenge for political analysts is to understand how the forms to 
which this gives rise interact with the fields of Politics. Gerbaudo, for instance, helpfully 
identifies an ‘elective affinity’ between social media and populism. He shows how the 
algorithms governing our attention online lead otherwise dispersed individuals to focus on very 
particular issues while the ‘filter effect’, in which people see only certain kinds of information, 
intensifies partisan attachment. Public discourses of social media which represent it as a means 
for giving voice to those otherwise excluded by ‘the mainstream’ have connected its use with 
‘a transgressive and rebellious posture’ (Gerbaudo, 2018a: 746; also Nagle, 2017). That is 
intensified by anonymity and the affective dynamic of computer-screen and keyboard which 
make it easy to express what might be thought unsayable: early adopters of ‘chans’ and 
message boards created a culture which ‘fetishized dark humour’ and shaped some of the 
practices associated with ‘trolling’ including the use of aggressive and insulting language to 
disrupt or shut down others’ arguments. As Philips shows, belief in the virtues of argumentative 
combat has interacted with the affordances of platforms, turning political discourse into a 
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virtual bloodsport (Phillips, 2015: 340-370). The more a speech act violates norms and 
provokes a reaction, the more it can be experienced as a heroic instantiation of ‘free speech’ 
and self-expression, and considered intrinsically valuable regardless of its content or actual 
contribution to ‘public reason’. The interaction between technological form and user culture 
has created a particular way of thinking about, and doing, political and public communication.  
 
Another key feature of the medium is important here. Online, the context of expression is 
always ambiguous. Things which help us decode meaning (a definite social situation, the social 
location or background of those speaking and, on text-forums, their tone of voice and 
expression) are missing; fragments of things said are easily extracted, circulated and 
recontextualised (see also Davis and Jurgenson, 2014). Consequently, disputes about meaning 
and intention dominate online discourse; arguments centre on peoples’ sincerity, prejudicial 
motivation or hidden interests which are seen as decisive for defining and evaluating the 
meaning of statements. 
 
A number of digital media have an ‘affinity’ with populist forms and styles of ideology and 
rhetoric. They push argument into centring on claims about one’s own or others’ personal 
character or ethos. Words are interpreted via assertions about the social (and moral) category 
to which the person saying them can be made to belong: a Remainer, a Brexiter, a man, a 
woman, a Feminist, a journalist, one of ‘the people’, one of ‘them’ – someone ‘who would say 
or think that sort thing’. Emerging into an already mediatised and ethos-centric political 
culture, digital media make moral character, categorisation and identification even more central 
to political discourse. This – as we will see - also affects the ‘morphology’ of ideologies 
(Freeden, 2012). How that happens varies across platforms which may be primarily textual, 
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aural or visual, with communication happening at different speeds and according to different 
rules. To develop the discussion further we therefore focus on just one. 
 
YouTube was launched in June of 2005, acquired by Google in 2006 for $1.65b and in 2007 
became the most popular entertainment site in the USA (Burgess and Green, 2018; Stokel-
Walker, 2019). Birthed into a market and a culture characterised by the rapid proliferation of 
media outlets, in which people had become used to the personalization of media consumption 
(unbound from the fixed schedules of centralized broadcasters) and the valorization of 
‘participation’, YouTube has been designed to intensify and organize a ‘multi-sided market’ 
made up of ‘audiences; amateur, pro-amateur, and professional content creators; media 
partners; advertisers, new intermediaries like the multi-channel networks and third-party 
developers’ (Burgess and Green, 2018: 9). Over the last decade it has supported content 
creators to professionalise and scale-up their activity giving rise to new genres of ‘social media 
entertainment’ (Cunningham quoted in Burgess and Green, 2018: 11). That includes political 
genres, the most successful of which (in terms of viewers) are, so far, on the political right 
(Lewis 2018; Munger and Philips, 2019). To understand what is happening here we need to 
consider how the platform shapes the production and consumption of content, and how that 
affects the style, rhetoric and articulation of political ideologies. 
 
YouTube radically extends access to media production and dissemination because it lowers 
entry barriers. It converts video into the necessary format, managing and hosting its 
presentation, so that producers need invest only a small amount in minimal equipment for 
recording. Because they are one of its products YouTube formally and informally trains 
creators in how to make good content as judged by the metric which as a commercial 
advertising service it naturally promotes: the volume and intensity of views. Creators are 
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subject to what Bogost calls a ‘procedural rhetoric’, the persuasive effects of ‘processes in 
general and computational processes in particular’ (2007: 3). The code that organizes YouTube 
activity produces and enforces ‘rules of behaviour’ which give rise to ‘content’ (2007: 29). 
YouTube Analytics provides creators with detailed data on the number of viewers, where they 
are coming from, demographics and watch-time. Combined with direct responses such as 
likes/dislikes and comments, this enables producers rapidly to adapt their productions, 
increasing and retaining audiences by giving them what they seem to want. Through the Partner 
Programme producers can earn a proportion of advertising revenue, supplementing that income 
(potentially quite handsomely) through selling merchandise, and via allied funding platforms 
such as Patreon.1 
 
On YouTube there is a feedback loop between producer and consumer much more intense and 
rapid than with television and radio, similar to the direct relationship of platform orator and 
audience but without constraints of time or distance, and mediated by the language of the 
software. Furthermore, the overarching context is commercial rather than artistic, civic or 
political. What is valuable is not any single video but the channel and the subscribers it attracts 
and retains. Individuals – to survive in such a market – must brand themselves and their content 
so as to engender consumer loyalty, a pattern familiar from ‘talk radio’ and ‘shock jocks’ who 
played a significant role in changing the style of political discourse prominent in the USA 
(Bobbitt, 2010). Within this system YouTube creators of, for example, make-up tutorials, who 
started as fans of particular products have been able to become respected product reviewers 
and, ultimately, creators of original product lines. Something analogous has occurred on 
political YouTube: the emergence from political fandom of new kinds of ideological 
 
1 There is also evidence of direct funding of political channels by, for example, the Koch brothers (Lewis, 2018: 
18). 
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entrepreneur, branded by their political character and able to sell directly to whatever publics 
they can find, cultivate and retain. Thanks to this system one can be a ‘professional’ living 
‘from’ politics, as Weber (1994) put it, yet independent of a Party or professional media and 
so free from the accountability and regulation these entail. Evidence suggests that consumption 
of political content on YouTube is driven by demand as well as supply and that it enables 
otherwise disaggregated political constituencies to take definite shape. White Nationalists, for 
example, whose political media consumption might otherwise be constrained by ideologies of 
mass media are, through YouTube, able to ‘switch into consuming media more consistent with 
their ideal points’ (Munger and Philips, 2019: 12). But in making the market for such material 
available, the platform incentivises its supply and the genres of political expression and 
communication suited to capturing such lucrative market share. Producers of online political 
content are accountable only to viewers, subscribers and, ultimately, the incentive structures of 
the platform. 
 
YouTube’s design shapes not only the production of content but also its consumption. 
Consequently, it engenders new kinds of relationship between individuals and political ideas. 
Raymond Williams famously characterized the experience of television viewing as one of 
‘flow’. Where communication had once been discrete - a specific book or pamphlet, a play or 
a meeting in a particular place and time – television created ‘a sequence or set of alternative 
sequences of these and other similar events, which are then available in a single dimension and 
in a single operation’ (1973: 87). YouTube, accessed via computer, tablet or smartphone, 
makes visual images part of a complex flow consciously or unconsciously created by an 
individual viewer as they click through sites and texts, follow links or view embedded content 
shared and spread on other platforms. Viewers choose what to search for and watch, freed from 
the centralizing powers characteristic of national broadcast media systems. But they are subject 
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to new kinds of governance. The procedural rhetoric invites and insists on participation; endless 
adapted recommendations are reiterated by producers’ necessary demand that we ‘like, 
comment and subscribe’. Unattended, one video will automatically slip onto the next, the flow 
determined by the algorithms running the machine, directing, intensifying and focusing viewer 
choices (Gillespie, 2014). YouTube is a pseudo-individualizing medium, offering a simulated 
experience of autonomy while compelling participation in the form of evaluation: upvoting, 
downvoting, commenting, subscribing, sharing and so on. Through such means audience 
members interact and may form ‘community’ beyond the confines of the YouTube channel 
through ancillary forums (such as those on Reddit) where video content can be discussed at 
inordinate length (see, for example, Ging’s (2017) excellent study of Men’s Rights forums). 
YouTube channel producers can participate in these, making the relationship of producer and 
consumer closer. That further encourages users to support creators through ‘donations’ which 
– significantly - feel more like a social relationship than a purely commercial one and may give 
special rights of access to otherwise unattainable content. Further participation can follow: 
sharing, promoting or defending a creator; making secondary materials such as compilation 
videos, extracts or digests of the work of the originator; creating commentaries, archives, and 
glossaries. Thus political communities form through online engagement but share more in 
common with commercial fan communities than with civic groups of citizens. They are 
‘affective communities’ of sentiment not interest. YouTube political content positions viewers 
as ‘followers’ to be enthused and retained. 
 
These aspects of production and consumption affect the appearance of videos. The visual 
appearance of political YouTube is often similar to television (and talk radio) dominated by 
talking-heads in apparently intimate, personal, conversational interaction, directly addressing 
an imagined audience. As Lewis notes, the political content of conservative YouTube in 
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particular is ‘often highly personal, told through subjective storytelling and affective 
cues…over long periods of time’ (Lewis, 2018: 18). This is linked to the branding of channels, 
often with the name of the person behind them, and producers develop a consistent character 
for viewers to identify with. The low-tech ‘DIY’ aspect of many videos intensifies this 
personalization. Seemingly ‘face-to-face’ communication comes from a ‘private’ space such 
as a bedroom, living-room or home office. The setting makes the videos seem personal and 
‘backstage’ and ‘frontstage’ blurring contributes to the performance of authenticity, the sense 
that what is being said is a direct expression of the one saying it and not subordinated to the 
demands, codes or rules of any other authority. As Lewis observes, ‘oppositional’ identity and 
claims to marginalisation are foregrounded and there is a premium on displaying ‘authenticity 
through transparency and responsiveness’ (Lewis: 2018: 18). Speakers deliver ‘ideological 
testimonials akin to product testimonials in advertising’; personal and ideological betterment 
combine and ‘influencers display the way they live their politics as an aspirational brand’ 
(Lewis, 2018: 28). 
 
The argument of this section has been that digital communication creates new forums within 
the public sphere, radically changing who can set up stall there, what they can say, who they 
say it to, how they say it and why. These ‘ideological entrepreneurs’ can cater to all kinds of 
niche political taste at low cost with potentially high rewards if they can cultivate and keep an 
audience, stimulating enthusiasm and participation. Ethos, already made central to political 
rhetoric and discourse by television, assumes even greater salience. Audiences are invited to 
identify with and to become fans of a politics through identifying with the individual who 
embodies it, for whom it is an attribute, an expression of inner moral character and something 
to which one may aspire. To see in more detail how this affects ideological form we now turn 
to an in-depth case-study. 
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Case-Study: Paul Joseph Watson 
 
The UK-based political activist Paul Joseph Watson is an exemplary instance of a new kind of 
political actor: an ideological entrepreneur earning a living from social media, producing 
regular, political-ideological commentary for an international following. He has 1.78m 
subscribers on YouTube where his videos regularly receive 750k-1m views. The most watched 
has been viewed 12m times. For context, The Labour Party has 34000 subscribers; its most 
watched video has 668k views. 
 
Watson’s videos present some challenges to political analysis: ranging from ten to twenty 
minutes in length they are combinations of word and image, hard to summarise in text. They 
are highly contextual interventions into ongoing political events and internet popular culture. 
His ideological position is inconsistent and never fully argued; he prioritises sectarian 
distinction over systematic theorising and is unconstrained by commitment to accuracy. 
However, he draws on established ideological traditions, cites political thinkers and regularly 
considers fundamental political concepts such as liberty, individuality, religion,  
transcendence, civilisation and decadence. His videos are an instance of ‘political theory in the 
wild’ (Finlayson, 2012): speech-acts which (re)articulate political concepts for non-specialist 
audiences, using them to analyse and explain events and phenomena. In the following 
discussion I first characterise Watson ideologically and then rhetorically, showing how the 
style of the latter, adapted to and shaped by the demands of YouTube, affects ideological form. 
 
First, a little background. Born in Sheffield in 1982, in the early 2000s Watson began 
promoting conspiracy theories on his website Propaganda Matrix: the Oklahoma bombing, 
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9/11 and London bombings were faked by governments; Princess Diana was murdered. Talent-
spotted by the American professional conspiracy theorist Alex Jones, Watson was hired as a 
contributing editor of the websites Prison Planet and Infowars (Hines, 2018). He has since 
become more focused on mainstream political and cultural issues. Watson began uploading to 
YouTube in 2011; in 2016, videos he made claiming that Hilary Clinton was suffering from a 
brain disorder went viral (Watson, 2016d); in 2018 he joined UKIP (Watson, 2018c); in 2019 
President Trump tweeted support for Watson after the latter was ‘banned’ from Facebook. 
 
Watson’s earliest ‘systematic’ political statement is his 2003 book Order Out of Chaos: Elite 
Sponsored Terrorism and the New World Order. A typical example of the genre of conspiracy 
theory in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 moment, it argues that a ‘power elite’ made up of 
the usual suspects - the UN, EU, Bilderberg Group, Trilateral Commission, Rockefellers, 
Rothschilds - believes it has ‘the divine right to commandeer total control of your life’ and is 
secretly behind all major current events. Much of the book is bizarre. For example, citing 
Hegel, Watson presents ‘thesis’ and ‘antithesis’ as names for conflicts staged by the power 
elite, which resolve into a new stage of their ‘agenda’: The Nazis and Bolsheviks, for instance 
were funded by the elite to fight World War Two. Rulers routinely manufacture enemies to 
‘hoodwink the real enemy, the people they govern’. As Jodi Dean observes, in conspiracy 
discourse ‘power is staged for itself’. Rather than explain why governments dupe populations 
Watson describes in cumulative detail the seeming connections between things, events and 
people, ‘showing’ that behind what you, the reader, think is merely disorder their lies a hidden 
hand. 
 
As Watson’s thinking has developed, the simplicities of conspiracy theory have turned into 
mainstream suspicion and rejection of state power, bringing him into alignment, in the first 
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instance, with Libertarian ideologies. From 2011-16 Infowars articles by Watson were 
published on the website of the American libertarian activist Lew Rockwell. He has drawn on 
and encouraged viewers to read books on Libertarianism, such as Libertarian Anarchy by the 
Irish philosopher Gerard Casey (2012), and argued that the state is by its nature a threat to 
individual freedom (Watson, 2014). 
 
It is not clear if Watson has read Murray Rothbard, the American Libertarian who inspired 
Rockwell and Casey. Yet his influence seems clear. Rothbard advocated a ‘Right-Wing 
Populism’ based on antagonism towards ‘politicians and bureaucrats allied with…powerful 
corporate and Old Money financial elites (e.g. the Rockefellers, the Trilateralists and the New 
Class of technocrats and intellectuals, including Ivy League academics and media elites, who 
constitute the opinion-moulding class in society)’ (Rothbard, 1992). In Watson’s videos the 
‘power elite’ is identified as that ‘new class’. In common with other online activists 
(Conservative, Libertarian and Alt-Right) he articulates hostility to that class using a number 
of specific names. The first of these is ‘Cultural Marxist’, a concept linked to a pre-digital 
conspiracy theory and used to invoke an idea of politicised intellectuals, ‘tenured radicals’ in 
Kimball’s phrase, who are said to exploit race and gender politics to further their own 
authoritarian ‘agenda’ (Jamin, 2014; Richardson, 2015; Manavis, 2019). The second name is a 
product of internet and gaming subculture. ‘Social Justice Warrior’ (SJW) is a pejorative for 
an advocate (likely a young woman) of ‘identity politics’ (see Phelan, 2019; Massanari, 2018; 
Nagle, 2016). The term came to prominence as part of largely online disputes about video 
games journalism (Phelan, 2019, 4-10). That makes it sound very marginal but its prominence 
and centrality within online political discourse cannot be underestimated. At its core is a 
mocking rejection of the very idea of ‘social justice’, of equality as a legitimate political goal, 
which has its roots in Hayekian critiques of the welfare state. A third, instructive if less 
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prominent term, is Non-Player Characters (NPCs). In video games NPCs are programmed to 
react in set ways to players’ behaviour, reciting a set script. As a political metaphor it suggests 
that ‘SJWs’ lack autonomy; incapable of free thought, they are puppeted by an ideological 
script written by others. 
 
In his videos Watson rarely directly advocates any positive political system. His focus is 
relentless critiques of “SJWs”, Cultural Marxists, Government, Bureaucracy, Feminism, Islam, 
Multiculturalism, Liberalism in which these names (and the alleged connections between them) 
function as explanations. Islam, he argues, is inherently violent and hostile to the West but 
actively supported by the ‘regressive left’ because both ‘share the same goal: the complete 
destruction of Western civilization’ (2016b; 2017b); contemporary Feminism is a creation of 
corporate interests and Cultural Marxists (2014b), part of an irrational ‘anti-science, social 
justice agenda, to force contrived equality…at the expense of empirical reality’ (2017g). 
Government bureaucracy is ‘poisoned by political correctness’ a tool to force conformity and 
supress resistance, and the UK ‘an authoritarian state in which freedom of speech and freedom 
of assembly don't actually exist anymore’ (2018a). Through such claims Watson becomes 
aligned, in a second instance, with classical Conservative arguments about the threat to liberty 
and order posed by ideologies which resist traditional and natural hierarchies and divisions. 
The unnatural presence of such ideologies is explained by reference to destructive, outside 
forces and the irrationalism of adherents - the “NPCs” incapable of recognising, or frightened 
by, the true autonomy of an individual who understands and is brave in the face of natural order 
and its limits. Libertarian individualism remains important however. Rothbard argued that 
humans are unique in being driven only by free will, undetermined by biology, psychology, 
history or society: ‘ideas, freely adopted, determine social institutions, and not vice versa’ 
(Rothbard, 1960, 5). Watson seems to share this view insofar as he promotes a conception of 
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the ideal and authentic individual as one wholly self-directed and self-created, undriven and 
free from societal convention. He even criticises the concept of romantic love as possessive, 
‘egotistical and greedy’, claiming that it ‘detracts from the only true source of sustained 
happiness: creativity and self-mastery’ (2018d). 
 
Watson also engages extensively in conservative kulturkritik: a thoroughgoing rejection of the 
culture of liberal modernity as decadent, stupefying and narcissistic. The ‘next great battle’ for 
freedom and ‘true individuality’, he says, will be a culture war. His early conspiracy-theory 
videos linked popstars to devil worship and this has become criticism of ‘vulgar, vapid, self-
absorbed, hedonistic’ popular culture, a ‘rancid assault on the senses’ which Watson blames 
on ‘post-modernist, moral relativist, critical-theory-espousing cultural Marxist nihilists’ 
(Watson, 2017c). He also dislikes modern architecture, citing Roger Scruton approvingly and 
arguing that modernist architects were ‘the social justice warriors of their time’ (2017h). 
Modern Art is another regular target - the preserve of ‘pretentious twats’ trying to appear 
sophisticated, and symptomatic of ‘aesthetic relativism’. Social Justice Warriors and Cultural 
Marxists have taken control (Watson, 2016c) and politically ‘abused’ art in the effort ‘to 
advance and ingrain far-left narratives’ (Watson, 2017f; 2017i). For Watson ‘Conservatism is 
the new counter-culture’ (2015c; 2017d). He sells T-Shirts bearing that slogan. SJW’s are fake, 
he and his followers are the authentic punks and teenage rebels of today (2017e). In the modern 
art gallery, as we wonder why ‘nothing resonates’, Watson says, ‘don't be alarmed, because 
they're only pretending to understand. They're faking it to look trendy. You're the only honest 
person in the building’. Ultimately, Watson predicts the collapse of a consumerist society 
which cannot give life meaning and in which ‘insatiable greed for sensual stimulation 
outweighs the urge for any kind of private or social responsibility’. Immigration is identified 
as a symptom of this decline because, he thinks, it will undermine the culture just as the Mayans 
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were wiped out by the Spanish. ‘For all its barbarity’, he remarks, ‘at least Islam provides its 
adherents with some sense of meaning’ (2019a). 
 
Watson’s political theory is, then, a rough blend of Conservatism and Libertarianism. It is 
similar to (and probably directly influenced by) North American Paleoconservatism. An 
ideological tributary which has fed into the wider online ‘alt-right’ (Nagle, 2017: 54-67; 
Hawley, 2017: 9-33; Drolet and Williams, 2020) Paleoconservatism blends traditionalism with 
neoliberal critiques of state overreach and inefficiency (e.g. Gottfried, 1999) organising itself 
around what Laclau would call an ‘antagonism’ to a ‘new class’ of left-wing academics and 
journalists considered coterminous with Liberalism as such. Like Paleoconservatives Watson 
expresses a conservative concern with the problem of change, linking a critical explanation of 
its origins (its imposition by ideologically-driven left-wingers literally in league with 
foreigners) with a liberal belief in freedom from both the state and from what Mill called social 
tyranny, but which for Watson consists of the social mores and cultural rules of politically 
correct Liberalism. At the core of this ideological assemblage is an essentially inegalitarian 
‘aristocratic’, crudely Nietzschean, individualism for which the core contemporary political 
problem is that freedom has been granted to those incapable of exercising it and who are now 
in thrall to evil forces on the left. The latter, believing that they can overturn nature, are a threat 
to the noble few able to bear the burdens of true liberty. This position makes for such a 
thoroughgoing reactionary politics, so determinedly counterrevolutionary, its critique of the 
present so intense, that it becomes revolutionary, neither defending nor protecting culture but 
aiming to bring the whole decadent edifice down (see also Robin, 2018). It is a politics of 
‘liberation’, of ‘us’, the true and authentic ones, from ‘them’, the anti-natural liberal new class 
and their herd-like, ‘NPC’, followers. 
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Importantly, then, Watson’s (not unfamiliar blend) of Conservatism and Libertarianism is 
expressed in a Populist style of the sort identified by Moffitt and Tormey: an authentic, moral 
and rational ‘people’ is contrasted with ‘them’, the wicked Cultural Marxists, fake SJWs and 
stupid NPC foot-soldiers. He demonstrates ‘bad manners’, calling Liberalism a ‘mental 
disorder’ (Watson, 2015b) and its adherents ‘libtards’ (online slang combining the words 
liberal and retard) while all Feminists are ‘fat and ugly’ (Watson, 2015a). And he certainly 
makes invocations of crisis and breakdown: our culture, liberty and way of life are besieged; 
civilisation itself is under threat. 
 
That populist style is part of a distinct rhetoric. Central to it is the trope of paradiastole; the re-
description and renaming of things so that they move from one moral-evaluative category to 
the opposite (see Skinner, 1997; 1999). Watson redefines what Liberals or Socialists consider 
virtues as not merely naïve and mistaken beliefs but as selfish and acquisitive tactics - ‘virtue-
signalling’. Advocates of equality, such as Feminists, are redescribed as hierarchical, wanting 
to dominate men; the allegation of racism is itself called racist. The focus of Watson’s argument 
is not on showing some positions to be in error but on revealing that they aren’t as they appear. 
This is different from the argument that policies intended to promote equality, say, will have 
the unintended opposite outcome or hinder individual freedom - the tropes of ‘perversity’ and 
‘jeopardy’ which Hirschmann (1991) identified as characteristic of reactionary rhetoric. The 
proposition is that Liberals and Socialists are masquerading, hiding their true (illiberal, anti-
social, inegalitarian, intolerant) nature. He wants to prove a lack not of intellectual soundness 
but of authentic moral character. Consequently, the argumentation never moves closer to its 
subject, into the particularity and complexity of concepts or policy proposals; it moves upwards 
and away, towards generalities and fundamental oppositions, showing things to be examples 
of something bigger, explaining and understanding issues and phenomena by giving them a 
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name which places them in a larger category of immoral things of which they are 
simultaneously an instance and an inductive proof. 
 
Naming through re-description is, then, a central element of Watson’s rhetorical style and of 
the form and content of his political thinking. This is also instantiated in the structure of his 
video essays. These almost always take a specific incident, issue or phenomenon (often one 
being reported on in mainstream media) and show it to be a synecdoche for a general crisis. 
Recent examples are women having children later (Watson, 2020), criticism of the movie Joker 
(2019b), the popularity of superhero movies (2019e) and the ‘cancelling’ of J.K. Rowling 
(2019f). Each instance is the conclusion of a logic which Watson traces back to its (thereby 
demonstrated) premise: the corruption of Liberalism. Visual imagery is important here. 
Watsons’s films are highly intertextual, with many rapid cuts between him talking and images 
which work as citations of authority (such as a documentary featuring Roger Scruton), 
evidential reference (stills of newspapers and websites – including Watson’s own – presented 
as proof for empirical claims) and humorous, mocking counterpoints. These images also name 
enemies. For example, short clips of women activists appearing aggressive or emotional (with 
no context provided) are inserted as comic breaks and empirical proof of what ‘they’ are really 
like; videos on migration cut to unidentified (non-white) people in an unidentified location 
appearing riotous, visual ‘proof’ of the chaos that immigration is said to create. Often Watson 
doesn’t comment directly on these images: his words form one part of a truncated, rhetorical, 
syllogism, the visual image another. For example, as Watson says the ‘enemies are at the gates’ 
a picture of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez comes on the screen. ‘Socialist vulture demagogues are 
busy licking their lips’, he continues (Watson 2019a). Viewers are positioned to draw their 
‘own’ conclusion, to complete the thought, give the Democrat politician her ‘true’ name and 
put her in the category to which she belongs. 
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At the core of all this is a rhetoric of secrets. The visual, structural and verbal rhetoric of 
Watson’s videos is oriented at showing what’s ‘really’ going on, hidden behind otherwise 
seemingly random phenomena. He reveals what ‘they’ don’t want you to know, what the media 
won’t tell you and others don’t realize but which is here presented before your eyes in living 
colour, given its proper name and assigned to the correct category. That is why a large number 
of the videos are titled ‘The Truth About…’ (for example Brexit, Yellow Vest Protests, Modern 
Advertising, Apu and the Simpsons, Migrants, The Border, Comedy, Oprah, Jerusalem, 
Kavanaugh, Incels, Shithole Countries and so on). Many others are titled ‘What they are not 
telling you about…’. The ‘secret’, as Black writes, is a rhetorical commonplace with 
‘uncommon powers of implication and entailment’. It promotes revelation ‘in the belief that 
such exposure will work to the detriment of whatever is revealed - that the secret, which is 
simultaneously concealed because it is evil and evil because it is concealed, will shrivel in the 
luminosity of revelation’ (1998, 134, 136). Subjects of such a rhetoric must persevere to make 
evil visible, to see the truth for themselves and name it for others. 
 
Here is where ethos – which, as we saw, has become central to contemporary political rhetoric 
– comes into its own in Watson’s rhetoric, in a way which exceeds Conservatism or 
Libertarianism and gives his populism a distinct ‘style’ and ideological flavour. His 
performance of a character, able to speak the truth, to reveal and so fight off the evil, is the 
fixing point of his (sometimes disparate) political claims, and the focus of the identification he 
invites. Where some political YouTubers confine themselves to giving a voice-over, the central 
image in Watson’s videos is himself: well-groomed, dressed informally but in a suit, a younger 
man, usually standing, looking slightly down at us, his face and body active, expressive and 
directly, confidently, addressing us (perhaps, headphones on, alone with him on our screen 
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talking in our heads). Behind him, often, is a world map, connoting news programmes or a 
military adviser. His enunciation is sharp, direct, aggressive but controlled, sarcastic and 
cutting, invoking the codes of formal broadcasting while ostentatiously breaking them with 
asides. His appearance and manner evoke a style familiar from talk radio, the to-camera 
editorialising of liberal and conservative cable news, and the kind of satire pioneered by Jon 
Stewart’s The Daily Show. Indeed,  argumentative weight often falls on exaggerated quizzical 
looks to camera and reading out statements in a mocking voice. 
 
Ethos and authority are established through this bearing and delivery with no hint of 
equivocation or hesitation. Watson is not cowed by the world which he stands in front of. He 
knows what he is talking about and is ‘knowing’, revealing the world in strident, directly 
addressed injunctions: a hard-headed, ‘rational’, ‘evidence-based’ and ‘brave’ perceiver of 
truth. His virulent rejections and mockery of so-called ‘woke’ culture position him as 
unconstrained, a plain speaking truth-teller. Obvious edits to cover for verbal slips, typical of 
YouTube, add to the performance of authenticity. While the crudity of the mainstream culture 
(which is also censorious) is an index of its inauthenticity, Watson’s performance of crudity is 
staged as bold polemic. The epithets and mockery he directs at feminists, anti-racists and 
liberals are heroic demonstrations of his power of naming which is also a power of truth-telling.  
 
Significantly, none of this builds to a plan for collective action. Watson advocates support for 
some specific political causes (such as Brexit) but does not generally promote any particular 
kind of political action or seek to recruit to a political party. The actions he urges are individual 
and his ultimate promise is of personal salvation not political liberation. In his 2003 book 
Watson’s revelation of the elite’s hidden-hand came with an injunction to readers to work on 
themselves, resist brainwashing, learn to see ‘the agenda’ and help others ‘realise they are 
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under attack’. A precondition for success was the ability to shield oneself from the stupefaction 
and hedonism of contemporary culture. ‘The battle begins at home’, Watson wrote, against 
feelings of depression or worthlessness: ‘if your state of melancholy cannot be explained by 
any single event, it is likely the result of countless years of this matrix false-reality pounding 
on your soul’. The promise was that if you ‘grab life by the scruff of the neck and reject all the 
outside emotional manipulation’ you’d feel freer, happier and more significant. 
 
The same themes appear in Watson’s YouTube videos (through which, incidentally, he 
promotes the sale of nutritional supplements). In a striking video from New Year’s Day in 2016 
Watson, expressing disgust at ‘human vermin’ drinking to excess, ‘lost souls’ confined to ‘an 
existence as insignificant and unfulfilling as farmyard pigs’, urged followers to hear their 
‘voice of conscience’, the ‘true human spirit’ which demands ‘meaning’ from ‘principles and 
striving towards something authentic’ (Watson, 2016a). In other videos he urges followers to 
reduce their use of social media (2018b), refrain from pornography and masturbation (2019c) 
and develop the ‘strength of mind’ and character to resist a culture said to ‘fetishize’ depression 
(bizarrely, because of the malign influence of Foucault) (Watson, 2017a).  
 
Watson’s performance of ethos is of a person – specifically a man - who has acquired such 
strength, manifested not only through his blunt, ‘transgressive’ language but also through his 
voice and bearing on the screen. The simulated intimacy of the camera close-up, consumed by 
individuals in their private space, makes him the focus of identification with the political ideas 
and ideology, more so than any appeal to abstract, general or shared interests. That performance 
of a way of being in and orienting oneself to the world forms part of a promise that you too can 
attain such confidence and certainty. He gives his ideal audience member (clearly imagined as 
male) an explanation for suffering and an enemy to focus on: the ‘entire economic system and 
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culture is now set up to be so hostile’ to working-class white men that it’s inducing their suicide 
and preventing discussion of it (Watson, 2019d). If you feel bad, guilty or weak it is because 
the enemy wants you to; your inability to appreciate or share in the values or culture around 
you is good because it is their values and their culture. In understanding that it’s all fake you 
have taken the first step on the road to becoming a self-directed individual. By participating in 
digital culture – becoming a fan and liking, commenting, subscribing and donating, by being 
rude to the feminists, liberals and anti-racists - you are liberating yourself, speaking the truth 
and being a hero. The secret of Paul Joseph Watson, then, is that his hostility to Liberalism is 
linked with advocacy of a typical form of (neo)Liberal self-governance: followers are enjoined 
not to change social/economic structures but to develop the resilience to survive, overcoming 
their feelings and becoming individuals fit to compete with and win out against ‘them’. He 
urges a work on the self that Foucauldians call ‘autonomisation and responsibilisation’ (Rose, 
1999). 
 
The argument of this section has been that the ‘political theory’ of Paul Joseph Watson is at 
one level a familiar blend of Conservatism and Libertarianism, antagonistic to the Liberal ‘new 
class’. This provides an explanation for events, feelings and experiences making them all 
instances of a cultural assault ‘they’ wage against ‘us’. But it is articulated in a distinct populist 
style adapted to the medium of YouTube. Central to it is the trope of the secret and a 
performance of ethos which invites viewers to learn how to recognise and name things while 
developing practices of self-care and resilience. 
 
Discussion  
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Paul Joseph Watson is an example of a new kind of ideological entrepreneur able to flourish 
apart from a political party or regulated journalistic outlet, earning a living directly from the 
promotion of a political world-view. His YouTube videos are a novel combination of ‘social 
media entertainment’, political theory and ideological rhetoric: a form of inegalitarian 
Conservative Libertarianism and a radical reactionary attack on liberal politics and culture, the 
articulation of which accords with the structural form of populism identified by Laclau, the 
Manichean and moralised content specified by Mudde and the populist style observed by 
Moffit and Tormey. However, strikingly, this style is part of a rhetorical appeal to individuals 
rather than to ‘a people’, giving them not a programme for a political movement but for 
personal therapy. Watson’s performance of ethos embodies an ‘ideological testimonial’, 
promising empowerment thorough the revelation of what is ‘really’ happening, giving things 
their ‘true’ name, assigning them to the proper moral category and negating their power so that 
we are free to work on and heal ourselves. 
 
This rhetoric is characteristic of the medium through which it is articulated. YouTube requires 
content providers to develop a brand and to cultivate a very specific relationship with 
audiences. It invites individual identification of viewers with content providers in an ongoing, 
remunerative relationship, intensifying a mediatised celebrity logic formed before the internet. 
YouTubers of all kinds perform a ‘stylised individuality’ around which there form affective 
‘fan’ communities. Apparent in make-up artists, entertainment reviewers and pranksters, this 
is also central to political YouTube where producers appear as special individuals with whom 
we may develop a personal relationship, and who can reveal to us information, skills and a 
truth which will aid us in our quest for self-improvement. Watson’s version of this is indicative 
of what Jodi Dean has called a ‘political-medialogical setting’ characterised by ‘dissensus, 
incredulity, and competing conceptions of reality’ (Dean, 2009:147). The liberal-democratic 
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commonplace that information and publicity empowers and enables publics is amplified in a 
particular way by commercial technoculture for which more information is always the answer 
to any question (Dean, 2001: 624) giving rise to ‘searching, suspicious subjects ever clicking 
for more information, ever drawn to uncover the secret and find out for themselves’ (Dean, 
2001: 625). What we learn from analysing Watson, then, is how this may take specific political-
ideological forms in a populist style expressed by political actors who claim authority as 
interpreters of texts and events able to show what they ‘really’ mean and what is ‘really’ going 
on. In this sense, and in Weberian language, the rhetorically cultivated authority of a YouTuber 
such as Watson derives not from a formal structure (rational-legal or traditional) but from his 
personality and presentation as a self-creating individual who rejects established forms of 
authority (political, journalistic, scientific and so on). His is a charismatic authority reliant on 
continued trust in the revelations presented and which, as Weber put it, promise to ‘effect a 
subjective or internal reorientation born out of suffering, conflicts, or enthusiasm’.2  That 
reorientation comes not from the acceptance of a truth tested in the light of public reason but 
from the revelation of falsehood, recognised by individuals for whom it is a route to self-
knowledge. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Understanding the ways in which the internet is changing our politics certainly requires 
investigation of its effects on news, campaigning and political organisation. It also requires 
qualitative investigation of how, as a means of communication, it reshapes and reconstitutes 
 
2 In this context, it is interesting to note that Weber observed that when it comes to money ‘those to whom the 
charisma is addressed provide honorific gifts, donations, or other voluntary contributions’ often in return for 
special access to the leader; this is exactly what one obtains from a Patreon subscription: membership of an insider 
community, behind the scenes access and the right to ‘Ask Me Anything’. 
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the forms taken by political-rhetorical discourse and how that in turn reorganises political 
ideologies and the relationships of adherents to them. Platforms for new kinds of political 
participant previously unable to reach large audiences, expand the range of publicly effective 
political ideologies bringing what were extremes into the mainstream. But in changing how 
these are communicated the platforms also reorganise the content and style of political ideas, 
how they appeal to potential followers and how the latter identify with them. Such changes 
have not emerged out of nowhere and while constituted by the technology are not determined 
by it. The internet intensifies a focus on individualised political personality, already 
characteristic of mediatised political culture (perhaps of culture in general) in which rhetorical 
justification rests on the performance of a social type, an ethos, and claims about self. The 
present article has investigated one example of this from one online platform. There are many 
more platforms and many other ideological entrepreneurs populating this new territory. It 
awaits and demands further exploration and mapping. 
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